|FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION FANNIE MAE filed this Form 10-Q on 08/05/2011|
decreased every month since February 2010. The decrease in our serious delinquency rate in 2010 and the first half of 2011 was primarily the result of home retention solutions, as well as foreclosure alternatives and foreclosures completed. The volume of loans impacted by these actions continues to exceed the number of loans becoming seriously delinquent, thereby decreasing our percentage of seriously delinquent loans. The decrease is also attributable to our acquisition of loans with stronger credit profiles since the beginning of 2009, as these loans have become an increasingly larger portion of our conventional single-family guaranty book of business, resulting in fewer loans becoming seriously delinquent.
Although our single-family serious delinquency rate has decreased since February 2010, our serious delinquency rate and the period of time that loans remain seriously delinquent has been negatively affected in recent periods by the increase in the average number of days it is taking to complete a foreclosure. As described in Executive SummaryForeclosure Delays and Changes in the Foreclosure Environment, continuing issues in the servicer foreclosure process, changes in state foreclosure laws, and new court rules and proceedings have lengthened the time it takes to foreclose on a mortgage loan in many states. We expect serious delinquency rates will continue to be affected in the future by home price changes, changes in other macroeconomic conditions, the length of the foreclosure process, and the extent to which borrowers with modified loans continue to make timely payments.
Table 37 provides a comparison, by geographic region and by loans with and without credit enhancement, of the serious delinquency rates as of the periods indicated for single-family conventional loans in our single-family guaranty book of business.
Table 37: Single-Family Serious Delinquency Rates
While loans across our single-family guaranty book of business have been affected by the weak market conditions, loans in certain states, certain higher-risk loan categories, such as Alt-A loans, subprime loans and loans with higher mark-to-market LTVs, and our 2006 and 2007 loan vintages continue to exhibit higher than average delinquency rates and/or account for a disproportionate share of our credit losses. Some states in the Midwest have experienced prolonged economic weakness and California, Florida, Arizona and Nevada have experienced the most significant declines in home prices coupled with unemployment rates that remain high.