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SEC Filings

10-Q
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION FANNIE MAE filed this Form 10-Q on 05/06/2011
Entire Document
 
Table of Contents

REO Management
 
Foreclosure and REO activity affect the level of credit losses. Table 44 compares our held for sale multifamily REO balances for the periods indicated.
 
Table 44:  Multifamily Foreclosed Properties
 
                 
    For the Three Months Ended
 
    March 31,  
    2011     2010  
 
Multifamily foreclosed properties (number of properties):
               
Beginning of period inventory of multifamily foreclosed properties (REO)
    222       73  
Total properties acquired through foreclosure
    50       47  
Disposition of REO
    (37 )     (13 )
                 
End of period inventory of multifamily foreclosed properties (REO)
    235       107  
                 
Carrying value of multifamily foreclosed properties (dollars in millions)
  $ 576     $ 319  
                 
 
The increase in our multifamily foreclosed property inventory reflects the continuing stress on our multifamily guaranty book of business as certain local markets and properties continue to exhibit weak fundamentals, though national multifamily market fundamentals improved in 2011.
 
Institutional Counterparty Credit Risk Management
 
We rely on our institutional counterparties to provide services and credit enhancements, including primary and pool mortgage insurance coverage, risk sharing agreements with lenders and financial guaranty contracts that are critical to our business. Institutional counterparty credit risk is the risk that these institutional counterparties may fail to fulfill their contractual obligations to us, including seller/servicers who are obligated to repurchase loans from us or reimburse us for losses in certain circumstances. Defaults by a counterparty with significant obligations to us could result in significant financial losses to us.
 
See “MD&A—Risk Management—Credit Risk Management—Institutional Counterparty Credit Risk Management” in our 2010 Form 10-K for additional information about our institutional counterparties, including counterparty risk we face from mortgage originators and investors, from debt security and mortgage dealers and from document custodians.
 
Mortgage Seller/Servicers
 
Our business with our mortgage seller/servicers is concentrated. Our ten largest single-family mortgage servicers, including their affiliates, serviced 76% of our single-family guaranty book of business as of March 31, 2011, compared to 77% as of December 31, 2010. Our largest mortgage servicer is Bank of America which, together with its affiliates, serviced approximately 25% of our single-family guaranty book of business as of March 31, 2011, compared with 26% as of December 31, 2010. In addition, we had two other mortgage servicers, JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., that, with their affiliates, each serviced over 10% of our single-family guaranty book of business as of March 31, 2011. In addition, Wells Fargo Bank serviced over 10% of our multifamily guaranty book of business as of both March 31, 2011 and December 31, 2010. Because we delegate the servicing of our mortgage loans to mortgage servicers and do not have our own servicing function, servicers’ lack of appropriate process controls or the loss of business from a significant mortgage servicer counterparty could pose significant risks to our ability to conduct our business effectively.
 
During the first quarter of 2011, our primary mortgage servicer counterparties have generally continued to meet their obligations to us. The large number of delinquent loans on their books of business may negatively affect the ability of these counterparties to continue to meet their obligations to us in the future.


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