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SEC Filings

10-Q
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION FANNIE MAE filed this Form 10-Q on 05/07/2015
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REO Management
Table 34 displays our held-for-sale multifamily REO activity.
Table 34: Multifamily Foreclosed Properties
 
For the Three
 
Months Ended
 
March 31,
 
2015
 
2014
Multifamily foreclosed properties held for sale (number of properties):
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beginning of period inventory of multifamily foreclosed properties (REO)
 
62

 
 
 
118

 
Total properties acquired through foreclosure
 
6

 
 
 
17

 
Transfers from held for sale(1)
 
(4
)
 
 
 
(1
)
 
Dispositions of REO
 
(6
)
 
 
 
(17
)
 
End of period inventory of multifamily foreclosed properties (REO)
 
58

 
 
 
117

 
Carrying value of multifamily foreclosed properties (dollars in millions)
 
$
343

 
 
 
$
575

 
________
(1)  
Represents the transfer of properties between held for use and held for sale. Held for use properties are reported in our condensed consolidated balance sheets as a component of “Other assets.
Institutional Counterparty Credit Risk Management
Institutional counterparty credit risk is the risk that our institutional counterparties may fail to fulfill their contractual obligations to us. Defaults by a counterparty with significant obligations to us could result in significant financial losses to us.
See “MD&A—Risk Management—Credit Risk Management—Institutional Counterparty Credit Risk Management” and “Risk Factors” in our 2014 Form 10-K for additional information about institutional counterparty risk, including counterparty risk we face from mortgage originators, investors and dealers, from debt security dealers, from document custodians and from mortgage fraud.
Mortgage Sellers and Servicers
One of our primary exposures to institutional counterparty risk is with mortgage servicers that service the loans we hold in our retained mortgage portfolio or that back our Fannie Mae MBS, as well as mortgage sellers and servicers that are obligated to repurchase loans from us or reimburse us for losses in certain circumstances. We rely on mortgage servicers to meet our servicing standards and fulfill their servicing obligations. We also rely on mortgage sellers and servicers to fulfill their repurchase obligations.
Our five largest single-family mortgage servicers, including their affiliates, serviced approximately 45% of our single-family guaranty book of business as of March 31, 2015, compared with approximately 46% as of December 31, 2014. Our largest mortgage servicer is Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., which, together with its affiliates, serviced approximately 18% of our single-family guaranty book of business as of March 31, 2015 and December 31, 2014. As of March 31, 2015 and December 31, 2014, one additional mortgage servicer, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., with its affiliates, serviced over 10% of our single-family guaranty book of business.
Our ten largest multifamily mortgage servicers, including their affiliates, serviced approximately 68% of our multifamily guaranty book of business as of March 31, 2015, compared with approximately 67% as of December 31, 2014. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. serviced over 10% of our multifamily guaranty book of business as of March 31, 2015 and December 31, 2014. As of December 31, 2014, one additional mortgage servicer, Walker & Dunlop, LLC serviced over 10% of our multifamily guaranty book of business.
We have seen an increasing shift in our single-family servicing book from depository financial institution servicers to non-depository servicers. As of March 31, 2015, 19% of our total single-family guaranty book of business, including 55% of our delinquent single-family loans, were serviced by our five largest non-depository servicers, compared with 18% of our total single-family guaranty book of business, including 48% of our delinquent single-family loans as of March 31, 2014. Certain of these servicers’ growth in recent years is due to acquisitions from both depository and other non-depository servicers. The shift from depository to non-depository servicers poses additional risks to us because non-depository servicers may have a greater reliance on third-party sources of liquidity and may, in the event of significant increases in delinquent loan volumes, have less financial capacity to advance funds on our behalf or satisfy repurchase requests or compensatory fee obligations. In

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