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SEC Filings

10-Q
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION FANNIE MAE filed this Form 10-Q on 05/07/2015
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Board of Directors by implementing the net worth sweep dividend provisions. Plaintiffs in Fisher request just compensation to Fannie Mae in an unspecified amount. Plaintiffs in Rafter seek just compensation to themselves on their constitutional claim and payment of damages to Fannie Mae on their derivative claim for breach of an implied contract. The United States filed a motion to dismiss the Fisher case on January 23, 2014; however, the court has stayed proceedings in this case until discovery in a related case, Fairholme Funds v. United States, is complete and the court sets a date for the Fairholme plaintiffs to respond to the government’s motion to dismiss filed in that case. In the Rafter case, the court has ordered the government to file a response to the complaint within sixty days after discovery is complete in the Fairholme Funds case.
LIBOR Lawsuit
On October 31, 2013, Fannie Mae filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against Barclays Bank PLC, UBS AG, The Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC, The Royal Bank of Scotland PLC, Deutsche Bank AG, Credit Suisse Group AG, Credit Suisse International, Bank of America Corp., Bank of America, N.A., Citigroup Inc., Citibank, N.A., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Coöperative Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A., the British Bankers Association (“BBA”) and BBA LIBOR Ltd. alleging they manipulated LIBOR. On October 6, 2014, Fannie Mae filed an amended complaint alleging, among other things, that the banks submitted false borrowing costs to the BBA in order to suppress LIBOR. The amended complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages based on claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud. The defendants filed motions to dismiss the lawsuit on November 5, 2014.
Item 1A.  Risk Factors
In addition to the information in this report, you should carefully consider the risks relating to our business that we identify in “Risk Factors” in our 2014 Form 10-K. This section supplements and updates that discussion. For a complete understanding of the subject, you should read both together. Please also refer to “MD&A—Risk Management” in this report and in our 2014 Form 10-K for more detailed descriptions of the primary risks to our business and how we seek to manage those risks.
The risks we face could materially adversely affect our business, results of operations, financial condition, liquidity and net worth, and could cause our actual results to differ materially from our past results or the results contemplated by forward-looking statements contained in this report. However, these are not the only risks we face. In addition to the risks we discuss below and in our 2014 Form 10-K, we face risks and uncertainties not currently known to us or that we currently believe are immaterial.
The future of our company is uncertain.
There continues to be significant uncertainty regarding the future of our company, including how long the company will continue to exist in its current form, the extent of our role in the market, what form we will have, what ownership interest, if any, our current common and preferred stockholders will hold in us after the conservatorship is terminated and whether we will continue to exist following conservatorship. The conservatorship is indefinite in duration and the timing, conditions and likelihood of our emerging from conservatorship are uncertain. Termination of the conservatorship, other than in connection with a receivership, requires Treasury’s consent under the senior preferred stock purchase agreement.
In 2011, the Administration released a report to Congress on ending the conservatorships of the GSEs and reforming America’s housing finance market. The report provides that the Administration will work with FHFA to determine the best way to responsibly reduce Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s role in the market and ultimately wind down both institutions. The report also addresses three options for a reformed housing finance system. The report does not state whether or how the existing infrastructure or human capital of Fannie Mae may be used in the establishment of such a reformed system. The report emphasizes the importance of proceeding with a careful transition plan and providing the necessary financial support to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac during the transition period. In August 2013, the White House released a paper confirming that a core principle of the Administration’s housing policy priorities is to wind down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac through a responsible transition. In January 2015, the White House reaffirmed the Administration’s view that housing finance reform should include ending Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s business model. Administration officials have also publicly stated on several occasions that the passage of housing finance reform legislation is the only responsible way to end the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
In the last Congress, members of Congress considered several bills to reform the housing finance system, including bills that, among other things, would require Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to be wound down after a period of time and place certain restrictions on Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s activities prior to being wound down. We expect that Congress will continue to hold hearings and consider legislation on the future status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, including proposals that would result in Fannie Mae’s liquidation or dissolution. Congress or FHFA may also consider legislation or regulation aimed at increasing the competition we face or reducing our market share. We cannot predict the prospects for the enactment, timing

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