

Ellington Financial



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*Morgan Stanley Financials Conference 2011*

Ellington Financial LLC (NYSE: EFC)

February 2, 2011

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## **Forward-Looking Statements**

This presentation contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, that are based on management's current expectations and beliefs, as well as a number of assumptions concerning future events. Such statements, including information relating to the Company's expectations for future financial performance, are not considered historical facts and are considered forward-looking information under the federal securities laws. This information may contain words such as "believes," "plans," "expects," "intends," "estimates" or similar expressions.

These statements are subject to risks, uncertainties, assumptions and other important factors, many of which are outside the Company's control, that could cause actual results to differ materially from the results discussed or implied in the forward-looking statements. These risks and uncertainties include, without limitation, changes in the market value and yield of our assets, changes in interest rates and the yield curve, net interest margin, return on equity, availability and terms of financing and hedging, credit risk associated with certain of our assets, and various other risks and uncertainties related to our business and the economy, some of which are described in our filings with the SEC. You are cautioned not to place undue reliance on such forward-looking statements because actual results may vary materially from those expressed or implied. All forward-looking statements are based on information available to the Company on this date and the Company assumes no obligation to, and expressly disclaims any obligation to, update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

## **Modeling**

Some statements in this presentation may be derived from proprietary models developed by Ellington Management Group, L.L.C. ("Ellington"). Some examples provided may be based upon the hypothetical performance of such models. Models, however, are inherently imperfect and subject to a number of risks, including that the underlying data used by the models is incorrect, inaccurate, or incomplete, or that the models rely upon assumptions that may prove to be incorrect. The utility of model-based information is highly limited. The information is designed to illustrate Ellington's current view and expectations and is based on a number of assumptions and limitations, including those specified herein. Certain models make use of discretionary settings or parameters which can have a material effect on the output of the model. Ellington exercises discretion as to which settings or parameters to use in different situations, including using different settings or parameters to model different securities. Actual results and events may differ materially from those described by such models.

## **Example Analyses**

The example analyses included herein are for illustrative purpose only and are intended to illustrate Ellington's analytic approach. They are not and should not be considered a recommendation to purchase or sell any security or a projection of the Company's future results or performance. The example analyses are only as of the date specified and do not reflect changes since that time.

## **Projected Yields and Spreads**

Projected yields and spreads discussed herein are based upon Ellington models and rely on a number of assumptions, including as to prepayment, default and interest rates and changes in home prices. Such models are inherently imperfect and there is no assurance that any particular investment will perform as predicted by the models, or that any such investment will be profitable. Projected yields are presented for the purposes of (i) providing insight into the strategy's objectives, (ii) detailing anticipated risk and reward characteristics in order to facilitate comparisons with other investments, (iii) illustrating Ellington's current views and expectations, and (iv) aiding future evaluations of performance. They are not a guarantee of future performance. They are based upon assumptions regarding current and future events and conditions, which may not prove to be accurate. There can be no assurance that the projected yields will be achieved. Investments involve risk of loss.

## **Indices**

Various indices are included in this presentation material to show the general trend in applicable markets in the periods indicated and are not intended to imply that the Company or its strategy is similar to any index in composition or element of risk.

The 2006-2 AAA ABX index, an index widely used and cited by investors and market participants tracking the subprime non-Agency RMBS market, is composed of 20 credit default swaps referencing mortgage-backed securities, originally rated AAA by Standard & Poor's, Inc., or Standard & Poor's, and Aaa by Moody's Investors Service, Inc., or Moody's, issued during the first six months of 2006 and backed by subprime mortgage loans originated in late 2005 and early 2006.

## **Financial Information**

All financial information included in this presentation is as of September 30, 2010 unless indicated as being as of a different specific date.

## Experience, Infrastructure and Performance

**Ellington Financial LLC (“EFC”) is a specialty finance company formed in August 2007 that specializes in acquiring and managing mortgage-related securities, including non-Agency and Agency RMBS and other mortgage-related assets**

**Senior Management’s Extensive Experience in the Mortgage Markets / Ellington’s 16-year Track Record**

**The Right Structure to Capture Upside and Protect Against Downside**

**Proprietary Analytics That Allow for High Quality Security Selection**

**Compelling Market Opportunity**

**EFC is Well Positioned to Take Advantage of Market Opportunities and Perform Across Market Cycles**

- **Ellington Management Group (“Ellington”) was founded in 1994 and specializes primarily in fixed income strategies, with an emphasis on mortgage-backed securities**
- **EFC was formed in August of 2007 right before the credit crisis**
- **EFC successfully priced its IPO in October 2010, making it the only mortgage-focused specialty finance company to go public during the year**
- **EFC paid an \$0.80 dividend related to Q3 2010 performance, an annualized yield of 14.3%<sup>1</sup>**
  - EFC seeks to buy high-yielding non-Agency mortgage assets at a discount; assets produce significant carry
- **Current environment is extremely favorable for EFC**
  - Banks are shedding high risk-weighted assets as a result of Basel III
  - Healthier financing environment
  - Prepayment volatility has benefitted Agency strategy

(1) We cannot assure you that we will pay any future dividends to our shareholders and dividends paid historically are not intended to be indicative of the amount and timing of future dividends, if any. Furthermore, it should not be assumed that any future dividends paid will produce the yield stated above.


## Senior management has an average of over 22 years of trading and risk management experience in the mortgage market

|   | Years of Experience <sup>(2)</sup> | Years at Ellington <sup>(2)</sup> |  |
|---|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| <b>Michael Vranos</b><br>Co-Chief Investment Officer <sup>(1)</sup>       | 27                                 | 16                                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Founder and CEO of Ellington</li> <li>■ Former head of RMBS trading and origination at Kidder Peabody</li> <li>■ B.A. in Mathematics from Harvard University (magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa)</li> </ul>                   |
| <b>Laurence Penn</b><br>Chief Executive Officer <sup>(1)</sup>            | 26                                 | 16                                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Vice Chairman of Ellington, CEO of EFC</li> <li>■ Former Co-head of CMO origination and trading at Lehman Brothers</li> <li>■ B.A. in Mathematics from Harvard University (summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa)</li> </ul>      |
| <b>Mark Tecotzky</b><br>Co-Chief Investment Officer                       | 23                                 | 4                                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Head of Ellington's ABS/RMBS credit investing</li> <li>■ Former senior mortgage trader at Credit Suisse</li> <li>■ B.S. from Yale University; received a National Science Foundation fellowship to study at MIT</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Robert Kinderman</b><br>Head Portfolio Manager for RMBS and ABS Credit | 12                                 | 12                                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Senior portfolio manager for Ellington mortgage credit investing</li> <li>■ Directs development of analytics to support mortgage credit trading</li> <li>■ B.A in Mathematics and Economics from Yale University</li> </ul> |
| <b>Lisa Mumford</b><br>Chief Financial Officer                            | 26                                 | 1                                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Joined EFC as Chief Financial Officer in September 2009</li> <li>■ Former Senior Managing Director and Chief Accounting Officer of ACA Capital</li> <li>■ 4 years with Coopers &amp; Lybrand</li> </ul>                     |

(1) Holds a seat on the Board of Directors of EFC.

(2) As of December 2010.

# EFC Leverages the Broader Ellington Platform: Our Infrastructure Is A Competitive Advantage



Ellington has over 100 employees supporting approximately \$3.3 billion in assets under management<sup>(1)</sup>

Sophisticated infrastructure supports rigorous management of credit, interest rate, liquidity, and other risks

(1) As of 11/30/10.


# Why Ellington Financial: The Right Structure

|                     | EFC's Publicly-traded Partnership ("PTP") structure   | REIT structure  |
|---------------------|---|---|
| Investment strategy | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ <b>Flexibility to protect against the downside</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- We were hedged in 2008</li> </ul> </li> <li>■ <b>Opportunity to capture the upside</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PTP structure allows us to fundamentally and quickly re-orient the portfolio</li> </ul> </li> </ul>            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ <b>Generally buy and hold strategies</b></li> <li>■ <b>"Long-only" investment strategy</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- REITs have limited ability to hedge</li> </ul> </li> </ul>   |
| Accounting and tax  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ <b>Investor-friendly: mark-to-market GAAP and tax accounting creates transparency</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Full portfolio MTM with third-party valuation input on the vast majority of assets</li> <li>- Management decisions based upon maximum risk-adjusted return and not accounting impact</li> </ul> </li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ <b>GAAP income, mark-to-market income, and taxable income are typically all different from one another</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Unrealized gains and losses placed in OCI instead of net income</li> <li>- Taxable income often significantly exceeds GAAP income</li> </ul> </li> </ul> |
| Dividends           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ <b>Target 100% dividend payout<sup>(1)</sup></b></li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ <b>Must pay out 90% of taxable income to maintain REIT status</b></li> </ul>   |

(1) Our present intention is to make quarterly and special distributions to our common shareholders so that approximately 100% of our net income attributable to our common shares each calendar year, beginning with the 2010 calendar year, has been distributed prior to April of the subsequent calendar year.

# Why Ellington Financial: Strong Results and Preservation of Book Value

■ Ellington Financial has successfully preserved book value through market cycles, while producing strong results for investors




Source: Company filings, Bloomberg, Markit

Note: Total Return is based on \$19.17 net book value per share at inception in August 2007 and is calculated assuming the reinvestment of dividends. Total Return from inception using the 9/30/2010 pro forma book value per share to account for our Initial Public Offering is 50.51%. Dividends are shown in the period in which they are paid, and they're paid in the quarter following the period related to such performance.


# Why Ellington Financial: Industry-Leading Proprietary Analytics

- Research team led by John Geanakoplos, James Tobin Professor of Economics at Yale University
- Proprietary integrated analytics platform managed by a team of 12 dedicated professionals, utilizing Ellington's extensive loan database and more than 1,000 microprocessors

■ When the market was predicting improvement in delinquency rates, *Ellington loan analytics detected a false positive*




■ Subprime mortgage index, ABX 2006-2, turned the corner and showed an improvement in default rates: *Ellington analytics gave us an early warning*



Sophisticated Analytics  High Quality Security Selection

# Industry-Leading Proprietary Analytics: Similar Bonds May Look Quite Different Under the Hood

Projected yield under various stress scenarios



**ARSI is stable across scenarios while SVHE collapses under realistic stress**

Naive: based on 3 month historical performance (prepayment, default, and severity).

Optimistic Model: uses CLTV-based performance projections assuming (i) home prices are flat in year 1, and increase 2% per year thereafter, and (ii) a 50% reduction in the projected default rates.

No ARM Reset: assume ARMS are converted to fixed rate loans.

Coupon Reduction: assume coupons are reduced for delinquent loans.

50% Advances: assume servicers advance only 50% of payments that would otherwise be advanced.

Model with home prices down 15%: uses CLTV-based performance projections assuming home prices decrease 15% in year 1, and are flat thereafter.

Double Dip Recession: uses CLTV-based performance projections assuming: (i) home prices fall 30% in year 1, and are flat thereafter, (ii) a 50% increase in the projected default rates, (iii) ARMs are converted to fixed rate loans, and (iv) servicers advance only 50% of payments that would otherwise be advanced.


Note: Projected yields are based on Ellington proprietary model results and rely on a number of assumptions. Realized yields may differ materially. The above analysis is for illustrative purposes only. The information presented should not be considered a recommendation to purchase or sell any security or class of securities.

Source: Ellington Proprietary Models, LoanPerformance, Intex. Data as of January 15, 2011.

# Compelling Market Opportunity: Very Strong Outlook for 2011

## Recent Credit Performance is Encouraging

- **Mortgage default rates appear to have turned the corner**
  - Delinquency rates in December 2010 show most improvement since 2006-2007



- But large overhang of shadow inventory can cause further home price declines

- **Housing crisis remains unresolved but outlook is promising**
  - As consumers continue to repair household balance sheets, they free up income for debt payments → improved credit performance
  - Since Q3 2010, household delinquent debt is down 8.2%<sup>1</sup>

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit, November 2010, Bloomberg, Loan Performance

(1) As of November 2010

(2) Includes 30, 60, 90 day delinquencies plus foreclosure and REO.

# Compelling Market Opportunity: Very Strong Outlook for 2011

## Opportunities for EFC are abundant - Supply / Demand imbalance creates opportunities

### ■ Supply:


- Non-Agency market is a \$1.4 trillion market
- We've seen over \$800mm of non-Agency bonds offered per day<sup>1</sup>, allowing us to remain extremely selective and still find attractive investments
- CDOs/SIVs/Wall Street prop desks selling MBS

### ■ Demand:

- Severe downgrades on most non-Agency RMBS have excluded a broad range of traditional buyers

■ EFC is able to take advantage of smaller tranches that are below other market participants' radar

Large-scale ratings downgrades have excluded traditional buyers



Source: Loan Performance, Intex, Moody's, Ellington. Includes all non-Agency RMBS with relevant publicly available data. Bars not drawn to scale.

(1) Approximate amount represents average daily current face of positions on bid lists of non-Agency RMBS received through Deutsche Bank, January 4 through August 16, 2010. Actual current face of positions on bid lists may vary widely and there is no assurance that any particular amount of non-Agency RMBS will be available on bid lists or may be purchased at any time.

# EFC: September 30, 2010 Portfolio Snapshot


- **Non-Agency Portfolio: \$348MM<sup>1</sup> / Agency Portfolio: \$414MM**
- **Short Derivatives Portfolio: \$75MM<sup>1</sup>**
- **EFC is poised to capture upside through its long portfolio and protect against downside through its derivative portfolio**
- **9/30/2010 Shareholder Equity: \$309MM; Book Value per Share: \$25.78**
- **9/30/2010 Pro Forma Book Value per Share: \$24.50**
- **12/31/2010 Estimated Book Value per Share: \$24.49 (net of Q3 dividend)**

| <u>As of 9/30/2010</u>       | Agency | Non-Agency |
|------------------------------|--------|------------|
| Portfolio Yield <sup>2</sup> | 4.12%  | 11.76%     |
| Cost of Funds                | 0.33%  | 1.97%      |
| Net Spread                   | 3.79%  | 9.79%      |

- **Leverage (Debt to Equity): 1.54x**
- **YTD EFC Earnings through 9/30/2010: \$2.21**
- **YTD Earnings distributed related to 9/30/2010: \$1.20**

(1) Includes PrimeX and other synthetic credit positions, based on their respective bond equivalent values. Bond equivalent values represent the investment amount of a corresponding position in the reference obligation or index constituents, calculated assuming a price equal to the difference between (i) par, and (ii) the tear up price ("points up front"). This information does not include interest rate swaps, TBA positions, corporate CDS and other hedge positions. The bond equivalent value of derivatives included in the non-Agency portfolio is \$78 million. Under GAAP, the net value of derivatives included in the non-Agency portfolio is \$3.9 million. Under GAAP, the net value of short derivatives is \$116.3 million.

(2) Portfolio yields are based on Q3 2010 interest income and amortized cost and may not be reflective of current market levels. Future yields and actual performance may differ materially. The above analysis is for illustrative purposes only. The information presented should not be considered a recommendation to purchase or sell any security or class of securities.



**Cash Flow May Contribute Significantly to Return: High Current Carry**

- **Proven track record and experienced management:**

EFC effectively protects downside *and* captures upside

- **Flexible structure and high current yield assets:**

PTP structure allows for strategic hedging, assets produce attractive ROEs

- **Compelling RMBS market opportunity:**

Market inefficiencies create buying opportunities, liquidity and financing is readily available

- **Sophisticated, proprietary analytics and infrastructure:**

Database of 30mm loans and research team led by John Geanakoplos, James Tobin Professor of Economics at Yale University

- **Significant management investment and strong alignment of interests:**

Management owns approximately 18% of the Company

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